






Until recently Cameroon was lauded by many observers, including World
Bank staff, as one of the most prosperous and most stable countries in sub-
Saharan Africa. Today, this rosy assessment has been replaced by gloom.
The country is facing an unprecedented economie and political crisis. After
some initial hesitation, the Cameroonian government could not escape
during the deteriorating economie Situation from calling upon the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank for the implememation of a
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). It was soon required to conform
to the new Standards of these financial institutions, linking Structural ad-
justment to democratization. So, in addition to the economie conditionality
that plagued African states during much of the 1980s, it was also obliged to
accept 'political conditionality'.
The IMF and World Bank are, in fact, the spearheads of the neoliberal
project that has become the hegemonie ideological project of our time
following the collapse of the socialist-oriented states in Eastern Europe.
The major tenets of 'neoliberalism' are: (a) the belief that rolling the
state back and liberalizing the economy will induce economie development,
and (b) the belief that there is an intrinsic connection between capitalism
and democracy. Democracy is thought to enhance the prospects for eco-
nomie development, while economie liberalization is thought to enhance
the prospects for democracy (Beekman 1993: 20-33; Jeffries 1993: 20-35;
Mkandawire 1994: 155-73). Recent World Bank repons signal a major shift
in the Western donors' perspectives, from a preference for technocratic-
authoritarian regimes to an endorsement of democratie government.
Democracy is said to be capable of legitimizing the imperatives of adjust-
ment. It can also improve governance and state capacity to implemertt
the austere adjustment measures. These reports, however, stress that sus-
tainable democracy cannot be achieved without the empowerment of civil
society.
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Like elsewhere in the world, the SAP imposed upon Cameroon by the
IMF and the World Bank has involved the application of a Standard package
of measures to stabilize the domestic economy, to minimalize state interven-
tion in the economy, and to give the market a freer hand in the allocation of
resources. These measures include reduction of public expenditure, removal
of public subsidies, dismantlement of public sector, privatization and promo-
tion of private enterprise (both national and foreign), trade liberalization,
producer price reforms, devaluation, restructuring of state institutions, and
legal reforms aimed at supplying an enabling environment. It is beyond
dïspute that the SAP has yielded some results in Cameroon: the labour and
Investment codes have been liberalized, several price controls have been
abolished, many import and export duties have been reduced, the commer-
cialization of export crops has been liberalized by withdrawing the buying
monopoly of the cooperatives, restricting the activities of the National
Produce Marketing Board to quality control, and allying local to world
market prices, and, of late, the Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA)
franc has been drastically devalued. What is most striking in the Cameroon-
ian Situation, however, is that most of these results in economie liberalization
have been accomplished only after initial government Opposition.
There is, in fact, ample evidence to demonstrate that the Cameroonian
government has constantly attempted to undermine the economie and poli-
tical reforms advocated by the Western donors and international financial
institutions. As a result, the process of economie liberalization has been slow
and inconsistent. The necessary institutional reform in the public and para-
statal sectors, for example, has been largely thwarted by government delay-
ing tactics and half-hearted Implementation. This is particularly grave as the
reform of these sectors marked by excessive costs and inefficiencies has been
a cornerstone of the SAP. Political liberalization has hardly gone beyond the
introduction of a multi-party system and a larger measure of press freedom
The government's weak commitment and limited Implementation has led te
protracted conflicts with the Western donors and international financia
institutions, sometimes followed by suspension of financial aid.
It will be argued in this chapter that the government's persistent Opposi-
tion to the neoliberal economie and political reforms can be explained b)
the class character of the Cameroonian post-colonial state. In his semina
book on Cameroonian politics, Bayart (1979) has claimed that the firs
President of Cameroon, Ahmadou Ahidjo, was instrumental in creating ;
highly centralized, authoritarian and patrimonial state and in shaping ;
hegemonie alliance out of the various elite groups in society which weri
given access to state resources and rent-seeking activities so as to cemen
their loyalty to him. This hegemonie alliance has a vested interest in th>
status quo and is inclined to resist any economie and political liberalizatioi
measures which threaten its control over state resources and rent-seekin;
activities. Apparently, its resistance has been successful: none of the reform
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implemented so far seems to have struck at the roots of the authoritarian
and patnmonial state as yet.
It will be shown in this chapter that one of the reasons for this success has
been the regime's proficiency in the game of token Implementation of
economie and political reforms. Another is its proven ability to play donors
off against one another so that conditionality has remained largely illusory.
This was facilitated by the f act that the major Western donors and interna-
tional financial institutions have continuously displayed a rather ambivalent
and inconsistent attitude towards the regime. While they have sometimes
blamed and 'punished' the regime for its lack of Implementation of eco-
nomie and political reforms, they have nevertheless continued to side with
the regime against the Opposition and to provide it with financial aid, for
mainly economie and political reasons. The IMF and World Bank have
never accepted the Opposition parties in Cameroon as equal discussion
parties, as they feared that any recognition of the Opposition might have a
negative impact on its established cooperation with the ruling regime
needed for the implementation of the SAP. Moreover, the opposition's
initial boycott of the economy, its fragmentation and its apparent incapacity
to present a clear alternative to the ruling regime contributed to their
decision to negotiate with the ruling regime exclusively. Given its enormous
economie interests in its previous Trusteeship territory, it is not surprising
that France has been even less inclined than other Western donor countries
to insist on the strict implementation of the neoliberal project.
THE NATURE OF THE POST-COLONIAL STATE
IN CAMEROON
From the very start, the Federal State of Cameroon which came into being
in 1961 following the achievement of independence and reunification of
the previous French and British trusteeship territories, faced enormous
Problems (Le Vine 1964, 1971; Johnson 1970; Bayart 1979). There was the
problem of underdevelopment and dependency. The economy was largely
dependent on the export of a few agricultural products - in order of value:
cocoa, coffee, bananas and palm oil. The tiny industrial sector, dominated
by French capital, was mainly involved in the transformation of agricultural
produce for export (Hugon 1968). France's predominant role in the national
economy was clearly indicated by import-export statistics. In 1961 it ac-
counted for 59 per cent of Cameroonian exports and 55 per cent of its
imports. Membership in the CFA Franc Zone tied Cameroon monetarily to
France; moreover, while it had the advantage of promoting economie
stability and allowing an open trade regime, it established a tendency
towards overvaluation of the currency and encouraged the development
of imported consumer tastes (Vallée 1989). Through the various agreements
of cooperation signed by France and Cameroon before independence,
246
CAMEROON'S POST-COLONIAL STATE REFORMS
France remained in a position to influence Cameroon's domestic and
foreign policy strongly.
There was also the problem of ethnic fragmentation and regional divi-
sions exacerbated by a colonial history that had split the country into
English-speaking and French-speaking groups. And, last but not least, a
civil war was going on at the time of independence and reunification,
particularly in the Bassa and Bamilike areas. This bloody and destructive
battle was the direct consequence of the determined effort of the Camer-
oonian government and the French to suppress the radical nationalist party,
the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC) (Joseph 1977).
The challenge of solving these problems devolved on Ahmadou Ahidjo,
the first President of the federal state. He was a Muslim and a Fulbe, the
dominant ethnic group in Northern Cameroon (Azarya 1978). Initially, hè
was considered by many to be a mere puppet of the French and an inter-
mediary figure at most. Indeed, hè owned his ascendancy to power to a
large extent to the French and hè enjoyed hardly any support in the south-
ern part of the country which had been more subject to colonial capitalism,
education and Christianity than the north (Bayart 1979). Soon, however,
Ahidjo displayed an unexpected political craftmanship which enabled him
to strengthen his originally weak position and eventually to construct a
system of personal rule. Centralization, coalition-building and repression
were his major strategies to concentrate political and economie power in his
office and person (DeLancey 1989).
The first strategy, centralization, had numerous aspects. There was the
concentration of administrative decision-making in the capital, Yaoundé,
and the use of the Constitution to funnel authority to the President. There
was the formation of a single party, the Cameroon National Union (CNU),
which was completed in 1966 after a two-step process of forging a single
party in the francophone area and then merging this with the remaining
parties of the anglophone area. As Bayart (1979: 163) has shown, the party
was firmly subordinated to the state, an arm of the government and parti-
cularly of the President: 'it is the party that emanates from the person of Mr
Ahidjo, not the other way round'. There was also the dissolution of the
federation in 1972 to form a unitary system of government. Centralization
was enhanced by the elimination of autonomous forms of organization.
Previously independent organizations became subordinated to the political
party through the party's women's, youth and labour wings or through
domination by or incorporation into government agencies (as had occurred
with the anglophone cooperative movement). Related to this were policies
to destroy any limited autonomy enjoyed either by local governments
(more a reality in anglophone Cameroon) or by traditional governments.
The second strategy was coalition-building. In his study of the Camer-
oonian post-colonial state, Bayart (1979) highlights Ahidjo's pursuit of
building a 'hegemonie alliance' out of different elite groups on the national
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and regional levels. This hegemonie alliance comprised not only of politi-
cians, bureaucrats and businessmen but equally the traditional elite, the
chiefs. From this heterogeneous coalition, a new dominant class was slowly
emerging around the state. Ngayap (1983) asserted that the ruling class in
Cameroon consisted of approximately 1,000 people. But if Bayart's conten-
tion that the traditional elite has also been co-opted into this alliance is
valid, I would submit that this number is rather conservative. This hege-
monie alliance was pulled together by several means, including the devel-
opment of an extensive patron-client System. Clients were supposed to owe
total allegiance to Ahidjo. Attempts by any of them to build a power base
of their own was construed as betrayal that sanctioned removal from office.
Ahidjo selected his clients on the basis of ethnic arithmetic or ethnic
balancing. He was conscious that representation in the cabinet, national
assembly, and so on, would reflect the various ethnic groups in society. As a
matter of fact, the government's hand-picked elite or barons served as
transmission belts between the President and the different ethnic groups.
Thus every important ethnic group feit represented within the regime and
thus able to exercise some influence on government policy (Jua 1991: 162—
70; van de Walle 1990).
Loyal followers in the ethno-client network were rewarded by appoint-
ments and nominations to state offices, access to state resources, and rent-
seeking opportunities. Beyond the numerous appointments Ahidjo could
make to the cabinet and elsewhere in the system, hè had a variety of other
techniques to allow individuals to profit, even though they might not
receive a lucrative appointment. For some associates of the President there
were special loans from the banks, loans without interest or any expectation
of repayment. Overall, the existence of smuggling and corruption provided
a major avenue for the President to allow supporters to receive rewards.
Special efforts were also made to appease and maintain support among the
civil servants or bureaucrats. They received excellent pay compared to the
average income of the Cameroonian citizens, as well as numerous perks
such as free housing. Despite these advantages, they were allowed to con-
vert their posts into monopoly rent-seeking opportunities. They considered
the state to be a resource base, from where they could explore various
pathways of capital accumulation (Geschiere and Konings 1993). The ex-
pansion of the state, particularly into the economie arena, was promoted to
manipulate and sustain the alliance. It would be wrong to argue that rent-
seeking and patronage were the only reasons the state promoted state
expansion after independence. Extensive public ownership conformed to
prevailing development doctrines, was warmly supported by the donors,
and responded to real development needs. Still, the scope that state owner-
ship was to achieve (by 1988, the state had more than 150 parastatals in its
portfolio) was helped by the fact that it afforded leaders like Ahidjo posi-
tions of prestige and power to distribute. In the context of the patrimonial
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state, these parastatals were converted into prebends for Directors-General
or to serve other exclusive interests of the hegemonie class (Joseph 1978).
Given this penchant of the parastatals to promote political rather than
economie goals, it is not astonishing at all that, for the most part, they
performed inefficiently. Their dependence upon the state for subsidies
became a permanent rather than transient feature. This furthered ischaemia
at the state treasury; by 1988, annual parastatal subsidies amounted to about
FCFA 150 billion (van de Walle 1990; Konings 1993).
While Ahidjo constantly emphasized the need for ethnic balance and
national unity, there is nevertheless sufficient evidence that two ethnic elite
groups enjoyed a privileged position in opportunities for capital accumula-
tion. These were, first of all, the Muslim Fulbe elite, especially those
originating from Garoua, the home town of Ahidjo, the so-called 'Garoua
barons'. And second, the Bamilike elite, renowned in Cameroon for their
'spirit of capitalism' (Warnier 1993). The Bamilike territory was until about
j 1970 one of the most important areas of UPC resistance against the regime.
«It is widely believed in Cameroon that Ahidjo was ready to grant the
Bamilike elite ample room for capital accumulation, on condition that
hey would not meddle in politics. Ultimately, in spite of the variety of
centives for cooperation and agreement used by Ahidjo, the stability of
regime was based on the widespread use of repression and the suppres-
n of human rights.
Ahidjo did not only succeed in gradually and imperceptively stabilizing
IMs regime, hè was even able to achieve a certain degree of autonomy from
ke French. Over the years, Ahidjo has developed relations with trading
partners other than France. In 1985, France accounted for only 35 per cent
Cameroonian exports and 44 per cent of its imports. The regime's
parent political stability, its lack of ideological posturing and its liberal
tment code appealed to the Western donors and business milieux.
an annual growth rate of some 8 per cent from 1970 to 1985, the
neroonian economy was long considered one of the success stories in
iiaran Africa. While not without foundation, this view of the coun-
'• economy has proved to be excessively optimistic as it failed to take
S^of several disturbing trends by the end of Ahidjo's tenure. Much of the
''s success was based on its rieh resource base, yet the agricultural
' Was stagnating: the growth registered was due mostly to increased
under cultivation brought about by expensive government and
' programmes, and it disguised the absence of sustained productivity
Moreover, infrastructural problems were daunting. The most dis-
g trend, however, was the rapid growth of a costly and ineffectual
sector, though quite understandable from political efficiency con-
itions. Cameroon's seemingly impressive growth rate until 1986 was
by the discovery of oil in 1977. Strikingly, oil output and oil
rtties have remained a state secret under Ahidjo's administration.
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Apparently, the bulk of oil revenues has been placed in foreign banks as
extra-budgetary accounts. The official justification given by Ahidjo for this
strategy was the elimination of the boom mentality that had crippled
agricultural production in other African countries following the discovery
of oil. Nevertheless, in conformity with the regime's patrimonial logic, the
primary function of these extra-budgetary accounts soon became to cover
parastatal deficits (van de Walle 1990; Jua 1991: 162-70).
Ahidjo stunned the Cameroonian population on 4 November 1982 by
announcing that hè was resigning as President of the country and turning
his office over to his constitutionally designated successor, the Prime Min-
ister, Paul Biya; the transfer to take.effect on 6 November 1982. Unlike
Ahidjo, Biya was a Christian from the southern part of francophone Ca-
meroon. He belonged to an ethnic group which is loosely classified as Beti.
Although there were promising signs of change at the start of the Biya
regime, it soon turned out that in all essential respects Ahidjo's System was
continued under Biya's leadership. Soon after his assumption of power, Biya
promised a New Deal. He spoke of a certain liberalization of the political
System, an internal democratization of the single party, and the need of
'rigour, integrity and moralization', thus challenging the autocratie and
patrimonial state (Takougang 1993: 91-101). At first, many Cameroonians
were sceptical. Biya was a product of his predecessor, Ahmadou Ahidjo,
and owed his political fortunes to him. Moreover, although Ahidjo had
resigned as the Head of State, he still retained the powerful office of chair-
man of the only party in the country, the CNU. Despite the initial scepti-
cism, Biya's many speeches following his accession to power helped to
convince many Cameroonians that hè was serious about instituting change.
This conviction was strengthened by a certain relaxation of police state
controls in 1983.
Whether the concept of New Deal was simple a public relations ploy to
extricate himself from Ahidjo's shadow, as some now argue, or whether it
was a genuine attempt to forge a new direction for the country, the Im-
plementation of economie and political reforms would be extremely diffi-
cult within the existing political system. Ahidjo had spent more than two
decades as Head of State and, during that tenure, had filled most of the top
party and government posiuons with loyalists or people who believed in his
political philosophy. Many in the government and the business Community,
especially the Muslim Fulbe, were not only unwilling to accept the fact that
Ahidjo had handed over power to a southern Christian, but also perceived
Biya's call for rigour, integrity and moralization as an effort to deprive them
of the rights and privileges they had long enjoyed under Ahidjo's adminis-
tration. Adding to the difficult Situation Biya faced, was the fact that the
former President continued to play a highly visible role in national politics
until 1983—4, when hè was accused of being involved in an assassination
attempt on Biya (Bandoio 1985).
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Therefore, in order to implement his New Deal programme, Biya had to
replace these men with people who were loyal to him and committed to
reform. However, it soon became apparent that hè was either unwilling or
simply lacked the resolute, tough and uncompromising leadership of his
predecessor to do so. For one thing, any immediate wholesale replacement
of experienced, albeit reactionary officials in the upper echelon of the
government might have seriously impeded the smooth running of the
administration. Moreover, many of the men in these positions were collea-
gues with whom Biya had served in government and who, like him, owed
their political fortunes to Ahidjo. Consequently, even though some of them
did not believe in his New Deal, he did not immediately replace them.
Certain well-known 'barons' of Ahidjo were forced to resign, but within a
few years they were back in prominent positions again, often as heads of
parastatals. After an attempted coup d'état by the Republican Guard, which
was still mainly composed of Ahidjo loyalists, on 6 April 1984, the police
state was reimposed in füll, with censorship, secretive government and a
powerful secret police.
Given that his hold on power had become even more precarious after this
failed coup d'état, Biya was compelled to raise the costs of maintaining the
loose ruling alliance. He needed to please the state apparatus, notably those
parts of the army which had supported him during the coup d'état attempt,
and hè wanted to meet the heightened expectations of his fellow Beti. A
direct consequence was the acceleration of budgetary and state employment
growth. The Beti elite saw the transfer of power from Ahidjo to Biya
simply as an opportunity to, in Bayart's words (1989), promote ethnofas-
cism. By implication, therefore, the fact that the President hailed from a
specific ethnic group, should automatically give his ethnic fellowmen the
right to monopolize power. Encountering great difficulties in consolidating
his power, Biya started to give in to these ethnic pressures and to co-opt the
Beti elite in the ruling alliance. The northern and Bamilike businessmen
who had enjoyed a privileged position during Ahidjo's administration were
increasingly replaced by Beti businessmen, the so-called Beti Mafia. Out of
protest against their discrimination, Bamilike businessmen withdrew their
savings from the banks and transferred them to informal saving circuits
called tontines (Henry et al. 1991). This contributed to the growing
liquidity problems of the banks. The Biya regime increased the number of
civil servants from about 80,000 in 1982 to about 180,000 in 1988; the
majority of the new employees being recruited among the Beti. The Beti
also increasingly monopolized the pivotal positions in the government and
security organs. Takougang (1993: 95-6) reports that as of August 1991,
thirty-seven of the forty-seven senior prefects (heads of administrative
divisions), three-quarters of the directors and general managers of the
parastatal corporations in the country, and twenty-two of the thirty-eight
high-ranking bureaucrats who had been appointed in the newly created
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office of the Prime Minister, were from the President's ethnic group. The
new regime's barons appeared to be much bolder in staking out claims on
the state's resources than Ahidjo's supporters had been. Corruption and
rent-seeking had always been fundamental characteristics of the regime
(Joseph 1978; Médard 1977); after 1984 they increased to the point of
becoming dysfunctional. When this political conjuncture was combined
with a severe exogenous economie shock, the system started to crumble.
THE POST-COLONIAL STATE AND
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
From the mid-1980s the post-colonial state was confronted with a severe
economie crisis (Kórner 1988: 77-94; van de Walle 1990). This crisis posed a
severe threat to the economie base of the patrimonial state as well as to the
system of prerogatives and privilege of the hegemonie alliance. A sharp
downfall in commodity prices and the slide in the value of the American
dollar against the CFA franc resulted in a 70 per cent deterioration in the
country's terms of trade during the period 1986-93. The state's oil revenues,
for example, decreased from US$350 million in 1985 to US$207 in 1988. The
crisis was aggravated by massive capital flight estimated at FCFA150 billion a
year which was almost a quarter of the annual national budget. The free flow
of currency between the CFA Franc Zone and France encouraged the Ca-
meroonian elite to transfer their capital to French banks which, moreover,
supplied higher interest rates than the Cameroonian banks. As a result of the
crisis, several government projects proposed or started in the boom days of
the New Deal were either suspended or abandoned because of severe finan-
cial constraints. The deteriorating economie Situation also forced many for-
eign companies that had invested in Cameroon to leave the country, further
exacerbating the employment Situation. The regime also experienced great
difficulties in paying cash-crop farmers. Cocoa and coffee farmers responded
by switching from cash-crop production to food-crop production.
The government's initial response to the trade shock of the mid-1980s
was to rely on external financing in the hope of favourable commodity
prices or exchange rate changes. As a result, external debt rose from US$2.7
billion in 1984 to US$4.7 billion in 1989. The IMF and the World Bank had
been negotiating with the government on and off since mid-1986, without
reaching agreement. At this time, Biya staked the national prestige on
refusing the tough austerity programmes of those two institutions. Through
1986 and 1987, hè insisted that Cameroon would undertake an adjustment
of its own, and seek only non-conditional capital from bilateral donors and
the private banks. He announced a cut of several hundred billion CFA in
the 1987 fiscal year budget, a hiring freeze, new taxes on luxury goods and,
in late 1987, the creation of a new anti-crisis ministry, the Ministry for the
Stabilization of Public Funds.
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Notwithstanding Biya's tough rhetoric, the crisis continued to worsen,
with expenditure overruns of FCFA450 billion in 1986-7 (out of a total
budget of FCFA800 billion) and of FCFA150 billion in the next fiscal year.
Recourse to the international institutions became inevitable. Agreement was
reached with the IMF on a Stabilization plan in September 1988 and with
the World Bank on a structural adjustment loan in May 1989. The World
Bank and IMF adjustment strategies have contained the conventional pre-
scriptions of important cuts in public expenditures, increased state revenues
and the compression of consumption, coupled with the promotion of
selective investments to foster long-term growth. They have called for the
privatization, rehabilitation or elimination of almost all of the nation's
parastatals, as well as thoroughgoing liberalization (van de Walle 1990).
Given the nature of the Cameroonian post-colonial state and the vested
interests of the state elites in the status quo, it is not surprising that the Biya
regime's Implementation of the adjustment policies tended to be half-
hearted and erratic. As van de Walle (1990: 54) perceptively observes, 'it
has attempted to cut off some fat, to excise some of its patrimonial tenden-
cies while maintaining its core logic'. It had little choice but to cut public
expenditures, since state coffers were empty, but personnel expenditures
were initially left untouched. To take one example, only 5 per cent of the
Ministry of Agriculture's total budget of FCFA39 billion was set aside in
the 1988-9 budget for non-personnel related expenditures. The absurdity of
this approach from a developmental point of view is well compensated by
the political logic of placating the administration. Despite his constant
exhortations against corruption, Biya continued to distribute rents so as
to regulate and dominate the different factions of the hegemonie alliance.
He also attempted to delay the reform of the costly and inefficiënt public
and parastatal sector, which was a cornerstone of the World Bank's adjust-
ment programme. In May 1987, he appeared to side with the World Bank
when hè appointed a National Commission to review the performance of
the parastatal sector (Tedga 1990), but, subsequently, hè took no action on
the Commission's report. It was only under constant pressure from the
World Bank that hè started to restructure the parastatal sector. In the end,
five parastatals were privatized, forty-four were liquidated, and the remain-
ing 104 were required to sign 'performance contracts' with the government
in 1989-90 which aimed at their self-sufficiency and eventual profitability.
These performance contracts often gave rise to severe cuts in workers'
wages and f ringe benefits as well as mass lay-offs (Konings 1993).
Cameroon's IMF standby agreement programmes, signed in September
1988 and December 1991, expired without having fully disbursed author-
ized funds and without a follow-on programme in place, due to the Biya
government's failure to comply with programme conditionality. In Septem-
ber 1992, IMF programming, World Bank project assistance, and Paris Club
debt relief was suspended because of accumulating debt arrears. It was its
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continuing friendly ties with France that saved the regime from the disas-
trous consequences of falling into the status of non-accrual, which would
have destroyed the country's financial credibility throughout the world:
France was ready to pay Cameroon's accumulated debt arrears with the
World Bank, amounting to FCFA60 billion. The important role of France
in Cameroon's structural adjustment programme is manifest in its financial
aid to Cameroon during the period 1990-2: this totalled FCFA181 billion,
representing 36 per cent of all aid.
For a long time, the Biya regime strongly refused to give in to the World
Bank's demand of laying off about 40,000 civil servants and state agents, the
more so as most of them were Beti. It was, however, ready to reduce
personnel costs. In 1991 it announced further cuts in the salaries and
benefits of government employees. For instance, there was a 50 per cent
cut in out-of-station and other allowances that civil servants could receive
and a 7 per cent pay cut for most government workers. It also eliminated
free housing, except to very high-ranking government officials such as
ministers, directors and secretary-generals. The government, however, ex-
perienced increasing difficulties in paying its civil servants. Rather than
laying off a certain proportion of the 'overdeveloped' civil service, it
decided to implement two draconian salary reductions of respectively 30
per cent in January 1993 and 50 per cent in November 1993. Remarkably, in
October 1993 France agreed to allocate a loan of FCFA15 billion to
Cameroon to help the government in coming to terms with the salary
arrears owed to civil servants.
France and Cameroon used to resist any pressures of the IMF and the
World Bank to agree upon a devaluation of the currency in the CFA Franc
Zone. In January 1994, however, they consented to a 50 per cent devalua-
tion of the CFA franc. In return, the IMF ratified a standby credit of
US$114 million to Cameroon on 15 May 1994 so as to support the govern-
ment's economie policies for the next eighteen months. The disbursement of
this loan was made conditional upon the government's termination of the
contracts of 20,000 civil servants. The devaluation seems to have had a
positive effect on the production and exports of cash crops, especially
cocoa, coffee, and cotton (Pelzer 1994: 205-15).
In 1990 van de Walle concluded as follows about the politics of structural
adjustment in Cameroon:
The inconsistent pace of reforms, its recurring breakdowns and be-
trayals suggest Biya is manoeuvering to placate the country's creditors
while gingerly testing the political limits of the reform process. Am-
biguity is an asset for Biya, as it keeps potential foyers of Opposition
off guard while cuts are made surreptitiously. Donor pressure and
threats can be used to maintain pressure on recalcitrant allies. Still,
Machiavellian machinations explain only a part of the reform's uneven
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progress. Some of the manoeuvering may be little more than delaying
tactics: time may after all solve some of the problems while a rebound
in world commodity prices could defer the crisis at least temporarily.
(van de Walle 1990: 70-1)
This conclusion seems still to be largely valid in 1994. In its political
manoeuvring and delaying tactics the Biya regime has continued to be
supported by France. One of the reasons for France's persistent support
seems to be the concentration of organized Opposition in Cameroon around
a 'hard' anglophone core. Another reason seems to be the strong belief in
French government circles that the shadow of Washington is behind the
IMF, the World Bank and the Cameroonian Opposition.
THE POST-COLONIAL STATE AND
DEMOCRATIZATION
By 1990 one could observe widespread populär discontent within the
Cameroonian urban areas with the regime in power and growing dissent
within the hegemonie alliance. Various internal and external factors are
responsible for this Situation. The majority of the population held the
corrupt, authoritarian regime responsible for the serious economie crisis,
resulting in its loss of legitimacy. Moreover, straight after his ascendancy to
power, Biya had started to project himself as an advocate of greater political
freedom and democratie reforms. He, however, believed that both should
occur, at least in the short term, under the auspices of the single party which
had been rebaptized Cameroon People's Democratie Movement (CPDM)
in 1985. In other words, the party was supposed to define the extent to
which freedom and democracy were going to be allowed in the country.
Nevertheless, his limited political reforms encouraged the people, waking
up after years of Submission, to demand more political freedom and de-
mocracy than the Biya regime was willing to grant. The traditional propa-
ganda, equating a single party with peace and harmony and a plural System
with strife and discord, feil on increasingly deaf ears. In addition, with the
end of the Cold War and the move towards democratization in Eastern
Europe, Cameroonians, like Africans elsewhere on the continent, looked
upon these changes as an added incentive to demand greater political re-
forms, including the introduction of multiparty democracy. Some of the
elite, particularly those who had become dissatisfied with the regime be-
cause of its promotion of Beti domination, began to give expression to
general discontent and even tried to organize the urban masses into political
parties. They were joined by some members of the middle class who had
become increasingly critical of the authoritarian and patrimonial state, such
as members of the Cameroon Bar Association, intellectuals and journalists.




repression on the part of the state which wanted to keep the democratiza-
tion process under control.
On 19 February 1990, ten prominent Cameroonians in Douala were
arrested and charged with organizing secret meetings with the aim of
undermining state authority and forming an alternative party. The leader
of the group, Yondo Black, a renowned lawyer, received a three-year
sentence from a military tribunal. Before and after his condemnation there
were massive protest demonstrations. Following this event, the call for
democracy and multipartyism became louder and louder. In reply, the
government staged anti-democratization marches throughout the national
territory in which participants shouted slogans like 'No to Precipitate
Democratization'. On 9 April 1990, Biya said calls for a multiparty System
were manoeuvres for diversion, intoxication and destabilization. In Bamen-
da, the capital of the North West Province in anglophone Cameroon, a new
party, the so-called Social Democratie Front (SDF), had been founded by
then and, according to its leader John Fru Ndi, had given details of its
formation to the authorities on 16 March 1990. When no reply was re-
ceived, the SDF organized a. huge rally at Bamenda on 26 May 1990, at
which police opened fire, killing six people.
During the following weeks there was a remarkable change in President
Biya's attitude towards the growing demand for multipartyism. In a nation-
wide address in early June 1990, hè claimed that Cameroonians had nothing
to learn from abroad with regard to democracy. He himself had initiated
perestroika and glasnost in his country long before Gorbachev did in the
Soviet Union. However, during the CPDM Congress that took place at
Yaoundé a few weeks later, hè surrendered to the multiparty System
demand. On that occasion, hè declared that the party must be ready to
face competition and added: 'Consider also that other schools of thought
exist which must be taken into account, fought against or integrated'
(Derrick 1992: 172).
What happened in those weeks? Even though that was the very time that
Cameroonians were absorbed in the good showing of their national soccer
team during the World Cup competition in Italy, and seemed to think of
nothing but football, in fact decisive pressure was brought to bear during
these weeks. There was the pastoral letter from the Catholic bishops at
Whitsun, which attributed the economie and political crisis mainly to the
egoism, corruption and authoritarianism of the state elites, and called for an
end to single-party rule. There was the resignation of John Ngu Foncha, the
former Prime Minister of anglophone Cameroon who had led it into the
federation in 1961, as an honorary Vice-Chairman of the CPDM. Foncha
condemned the shooting and expressed the demand being made by anglo-
phone Cameroonians for a return to a federal System. There was the
pressure from the IMF and World Bank as well as from other international
aid organizations. Financial assistance and loans were suspended, leaving
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the Cameroonian government with hardly any alternative but to open up
grudgingly to the Opposition. There was also pressure from France, which a
regime so close to France for thirty years could not ignore. At the Sixteenth
Summit of France and African States, held on 20-21 June 1990 at La Baule
in France, the declaration agreed on by those attending, including Biya,
spoke of 'the need to associate the relevant population more closely with
the construction of their political, social and economie future'. Franc.ois
Mitterrand, speaking for himself, went further and said French aid would
be 'less enthusiastic to regimes which behave in an authoritarian fashion and
fail to accept the move towards democracy' (Derrick 1992: 172).
After the surrender in principle, months passed before a new law was
passed by the National Assembly on 5 December 1990, formally allowing
creation of several parties on certain conditions. But, in the meantime, there
was relaxation in many other ways. Many demonstrations and meetings
were held in the Cameroonian cities. They expressed the new-found free-
dom and pent-up feelings about decades without freedom. Similarly, a free
press blossomed, until after a few months, there were about sixty news-
papers in circulation, including about fifteen dailies. The government did
not take all this unrestrained freedom and met it with repression, but fitful
repression that failed to check it. So as soon as new parties were formed,
hundreds of thousands of people were waiting to rush to join them.
In the first months of 1991 new parties received their registration. The
major new parties were:
• The Social Democratie Front (SDF). This was originally largely an
anglophone party, but it was capable of gradually extending its member-
ship to the francophone area, notably to the neighbouring francophone
provinces. For example it enjoyed great support among the Bamilike in
the West Province, an ethnic group that was closely related to the people
in the Bamenda area, the craddle of the SDF. The party's Chairman was
John Fru Ndi, a librarian by profession, who had failed to win a seat in
the National Assembly on a CPDM ticket during the 1988 elections. He
soon achieved an immense popularity among the urban masses because
of his great courage and populist style of leadership.
• The Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC). This radical pre-
independence party which had been suppressed by the French and
Ahidjo government, was refounded and was capable of rewinning strong
support in its original areas of Operation, Douala, the economie capital,
and the Bamilike-Bassa regions. lts leadership consisted partly of ex-
CPDM leaders and partly of old UPC leaders who had returned from
exile. The party was soon marked by internal divisions based on perso-
nal, ideological and ethnic considerations.
• The Union Nationale pour la Democratie et Ie Progrès (UNDP). This
party enjoyed most support among the Fulbe of Northern Cameroon,
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Ahidjo's ethnic group. lts leadership had held prominent positions in the
party and the government during the Ahidjo period and early Biya
period. It claimed the Ahidjo heritage.
These three parties were the main contenders with the CPDM by mid-
1990. Many other parties were authorized, making a total of no less than
forty-eight (with about twenty others operating but not legally registered)
by early 1992. The legalization of many small parties was suspected in
Cameroon to be intended to split the Opposition to the government party.
Strikingly, none of the parties had worked out a well-defined programme,
except maybe the SDP. Most of them did not go beyond generally calling
for better social justice, cleaning up of public life, an end to secretive
government, and measures to restore the economie Situation. In this respect,
it is worthwhile to mention that nearly all of them supported the Imple-
mentation of the SAP in Cameroon. Apparently, their main concern was to
devise strategies for the seizure of power from the ruling CPDM govern-
ment. Like the ruling party, they usually tried to recruit their members
through the creation of an ethno-client network (Schilder 1993: 115-22). Of
course, the charisma of the leadership, too, tended to be an important asset
in the expansion of their membership.
The formation of the new parties was accompanied by a rise in populär
protest in the cities. The growing number of unemployed, taxi-drivers,
students and other social groups took to the streets to air their own specific
grievances and their general discontent with the regime in power. Contrary
to many other African countries, the trade unions refused to join and lead
this populär protest as they were still state-controlled. There were several
bloody clashes between the demonstrators and the forces of law and order
which led to several people being killed in April 1991. By April 1991, party
leaders and their followers were uniting around the claim for a national
conference. This claim was inspired by the national conferences that had
previously been organized in Benin and Congo during the transition to new
multiparty regimes. Such conferences aimed at bringing together political,
religieus, business, trade union and other leaders in society, and assuming
power to decide radical constitutional and other changes. In Benin the
conference assumed sovereign power and ordered implementation of the
changes decided, and this was what the Opposition wanted in Cameroon, It
wanted to force the authoritarian state to accept possibly radical constitu-
tional changes and to exposé misgovernment and corruption without fear.
Such ideas, which were a challenge to the authoritarian, patrimonial state,
enjoyed massive populär support.
Unsurprisingly, the Biya regime strongly opposed the organization of
such a conference which was most likely to be transformed into a national
tribunal. In a broadcast on 11 April 1991 Biya said that Cameroon did not
need a national conference because 'democracy is already a reality'. His
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refusal to consider a national conference gave rise to a long period of
confrontation between the regime and the Opposition. This confromation
was launched by a demonstration demanding a national conference at
Bamenda on 11 May 1991, and the start of mass civil disobedience on 13
May 1991; there was also a general strike on 16-17 May 1991, widely
followed in the western and northern provinces. From 24 June 1991 the
most intense phase began, with the opposition's extension of civil disobe-
dience to become a total shutdown in the cities, the so-called 'ghost town'
campaign. This campaign involved the stoppage of all work, all trade, all
traffic in the cities, except for Friday evenings and Saturdays, resulting in
huge personal and public financial losses and an aggravation of the econom-
ie crisis. The government responded by not giving in.
For various reasons this ghost town campaign was not successful. It was
not backed in the Beti region which remained loyal to Biya. This brought
about a dangerous polarization on ethnic lines (the Beti versus the rest)
which nearly led to a civil war. The state apparatus might have broken
down if Biya had not had that solid regional backing. In the event it never
broke down altogether. The government kept control over the forces of law
and order and used them regularly to clamp down on the Opposition.
The IMF and World Bank had regularly expressed their disapproval of the
ghost town campaign. Greatly concerned about the adverse effect of this
campaign on the national economy and SAP, they had regularly appealed to
the government and Opposition to arrive at a negotiated settlement. Both
sides, however, ignored these appeals until October 1991 when it became
evident that the ghost town campaign and, above all, the strength of the
sympathetic population had exhausted themselves. Moreover, by that time
there were tense conflicts among the Opposition leaders about future strategy.
The offer of talks by Biya on 11 October 1991 was accepted by the
Opposition parties and the ghost town campaign petered out. A tripartite
conference held at Yaoundé from 30 October to 17 November 1991,
attended by government and Opposition representatives and other promi-
nent personalities who mediated and advised, led to agreements on 17
November 1991 which confirmed the government victory under a poli te
disguise. It was agreed that elections for a new National Assembly would
soon be held and that, in the meantime, all protest campaigns would be
called off. Some Opposition parties even dropped the national conference
idea. This, and the failure to arrive at a programme for change, were the
main reasons why other Opposition parties, like the SDF, declined to sign
the agreements.
Among those satisfied with the agreements were the IMF and World
Bank as well as the government of France. Biya attended a francophone
state summit in Paris soon afterwards and was said to have had a good
reception and approval from Mitterrand. Although some of Mitterrand's
Africa policy-makers seemed to have favoured a national conference in
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Cameroon, a delegation of Cameroonian Opposition leaders had failed to
win support in Paris in late August 1991.
Of the major Opposition parties, the SDF decided to boycott the Na-
tional Assembly elections which were held on l March 1992. lts Chairman,
John Fru Ndi, said that the new election code, which was promulgated on
16 December 1991, was bad and that there was no guarantee of just and fair
elections. Moreover, the election date was too early as most parties had not
had sufficient time to organize and to préparé themselves for the coming
elections. The government could afford to remain unmoved by such criti-
cisms backed up by no more than the threat of a negative and self-defeating
boycott. In the event, the elections distributed the 180 National Assembly
seats among four parties only: the CPDM won 80, the UNDP 68, the UPC
18 and the Mouvement Démocratique de la République (MDR) 6.
The MDR was a party not considered important before the elections. It
was headed by Dakole Daïssala, former Chairman of the city bus Corpora-
tion Société des Transports Urbains en Commun du Cameroun (SOTUC),
arrested as a northerner af ter the April 1984 coup d'état and held for six
years without trial. He is one of the Kirdi, the ethnic minority groups in the
north which were historically subordinate to the Fulbe and remained pagan
or became Christian rather than Muslim (Motaze 1990). Most of the Kirdi
declined to join the Fulbe-dominated UNDP and, during the elections,
tended to cast their votes in favour of either the CPDM or the MDR.
For a party which had the füll support of the government and its local
officials, and which was the only party to field candidates in all forty-nine
constituencies, the CPDM's showing was not too impressive. Eventually, it
was three seats short of a majority in the Assembly, but after several weeks
of discussion it agreed on a coalition with the MDR. This first coalition-
government in Cameroon was headed by an Anglophone from the North
West Province, Simon Achidu Achu. A former Minister of Justice under
Ahidjo, hè is the first anglophone Cameroonian to be Prime Minister of
Cameroon. Biya indeed owes them many thanks, for their following the
SDF call to boycott the polls ensured the CPDM's victory.
Soon afterwards, Biya announced that presidential elections were to be
held on 11 October 1992 and that hè would stand again as the government
candidate during these elections. During the subsequent negotiations, the
Opposition parties failed to unite on the selection of one common candidate.
A mixture of personal and ethnic animosities impeded any agreement.
Eventually, approximately thirty Opposition parties decided to support the
SDF candidate, John Fru Ndi. After the elections which were marked by
massive fraud, Biya was declared to be the victor. He was said to have won
39.9 per cent of the votes cast, 4 per cent more than John Fru Ndi. This was
f ar short of the almost 100 per cent hè had received in each of the two
previous elections in 1984 and 1988 respectively, when hè was the only
candidate running for the post. He only won in the South, Centre and East
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Provinces (partly coinciding with the Beti area), but woefully lost in the
other provinces.
After the elections, there were violent protests in Bamenda and the entire
North West Province against 'Biya's theft of John Fru Ndi's victory'. Biya
then imposed a state of emergency on this province for three months and
John Fru Ndi was kept under military surveillance in his house at Bamenda.
Many political activists, journalists and students, particular Anglophones
and Bamilike, were arrested and tortured. The United States, Germany and
the European Common Market had denounced the fraudulent elections and
the state of emergency in the North West Province and threatened to
abandon their aid programmes to Cameroon until 'there was a clear ad-
vancement in the democratie process'. Particularly the United States has
often expressed its disapproval of Biya's authoritarian regime and has
openly supported John Fru Ndi. The critical attitude of the United States
towards the regime encouraged France to display its support for Biya, who
appeared to be more likely to safeguard French interests in Cameroon than
the Anglophone, John Fru Ndi.
Biya's victory was a pyrrhic one. Still desperately seeking for legitimacy,
because of his rejection by over 60 per cent of the population, and with the
economy in complete shambles and the civil service in a state of general
apathy, the President was more isolated than ever. To broaden his base of
support, Biya formed a government of national unity after the elections.
Some individual members of the UNDP and the moderate faction of the
UPC accepted ministerial posts. The SDF, on the contrary, refused to
collaborate with a government of national unity.
It would appear as if the democratization process in Cameroon has stag-
nated. The power of the President is still relatively unlimited; the Separation
between the state and CPDM party is still insufficient; censorship of the
press, violation of human rights and military excesses are still commonplace.
CONCLUSION
This study has tried to demonstrate that the neoliberal project, which has
been propagated by the Western donors and international financial institu-
tions and largely supported by Opposition parties, has not yet made much
progress in Cameroon. This is not altogether surprising. Given the class
character of the Cameroonian post-colonial state, the slow and inconsistent
pace of economie liberalization was to be expected. The patrimonial logic
on which the post-colonial state is built forms a clear obstacle to the
institutional changes needed to carry through a transformation to market-
oriented and private sector-led growth.
The rather limited political reforms introduced by the Biya regime in 1990,
especially the legalization of multipartyism, seem not to have stimulated
economie liberalization but rather to have further eroded the authoritarian
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and patrimonial state's capacity and willingness to undertake economie
reforms. The Biya regime rightly feared that the Implementation of eco-
nomie reforms, such as the dismantlement and privatization of the costly
and inefficiënt parastatal sector and the reduction of the public service,
would fuel populär discontent and augment the membership of the Opposi-
tion parties. Moreover, it was obliged to proceed with the supply of privi-
leges, in the form of rent-seeking opportunities, so as to maintain the
hegemonie alliance and to stave off Opposition. In addition, the regime's
loss of legitimacy and the increasing political instability encouraged capital
flight and deterred foreign and national private Investments.
The Biya regime appears to have been quite successful in resisting the
internal and external pressures to speed up the process of economie and
political liberalization. As a result, the post-colonial state remains very
much as it always has been. Several reasons have been given in this chapter
to explain the paradox of the evident lack of commitment to economie and
political reform and the remarkable survival of the authoritarian, patrimo-
nial state during the present economie and political crisis. First, the Biya
regime has continued to control the (shrinking) state resources, which
enables it to buy the loyalty of the state elites and to co-opt some of the
Opposition leaders into the hegemonie alliance. It also continues to control
the forces of law and order, which enables it to intimidate and oppress the
Opposition. Moreover, it continues to monopolize some pivotal mass com-
munication media like the television, which enables it to preclude the
Opposition parties from presenting their leaders and programmes to the
public. Second, the Biya regime has continued to enjoy the firm support
of the Beti elite who feared that their privileged access to state resources
would come to an end with the Opposition parties' seizure of power. Third,
the Opposition parties seem hardly to differ from the ruling party, using
similar ethno-client networks for the expansion of their power base. And,
above all, their leadership is divided by personal and ethnic animosities.
And finally, the Biya regime has exploited to the füll the ambivalent and
inconsistent role of the Western donors and international financial institu-
tions in the execution of the neoliberal project. The IMF and World Bank
depend upon the ruling regime's continuous cooperation for the successful
implementation of the SAP to such an extent that they tend to confine
themselves to quiet diplomacy, except in cases of extreme violations of
human rights. Conversely, they decline to negotiate with the Opposition.
They have even expressed their strong disapproval of certain oppositional
actions, such as the 'ghost town' campaign in 1991, which they perceived as
a further onslaught on the already shattered national economy and an
obstruction of the SAP. Undoubtedly, in its struggle for survival, the Biya
regime owes a particular debt to France. France has tried to safeguard its
economie interests in Cameroon by regularly assisting the Biya regime in
overcoming any internal and external oppositional action. In January 1992,
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it did not even hesitate to supply the Biya regime with arms for the
maintenance of public order.
Of late, however, there are some indications that the Western donors and
international financial institutions are losing patience with the slow and
inconsistent pace of economie liberalization in Cameroon and becoming
more determined to impose upon the Biya regime the tough choices it
has so far avoided. In 1994, the World Bank forced the regime to lay off
20,000 civil servants and to announce the privatization of a first batch of
fifteen important parastatal enterprises, notably in the transport and agro-
industrial sectors.
It is most unlikely that the eventual achievement of greater political
liberalization in Cameroon will enhance the prospects for any thorough
economie liberalization. Political liberalization may even strengthen the
patrimonial features of the Cameroonian post-colonial state. Although
most Opposition parties claim to champion economie liberalization, their
capacity to implement the necessary economie reforms is very much open
to question, since they appear to resemble closely the ruling regime in their
frequent resort to patrimonial practices.
Much of the current thinking about political liberalization in Africa implies
that institutional and economie change will be effected via the emergence of
stronger civil societies. As a result, successful economie reforms require not
only increased levels of state capacity but also higher levels of 'civil society
capacity', that is, the effective and sustained organization of social interests
over time. Civil society capacity, however, is still underdeveloped in Camer-
oon. Every organized group in Cameroonian civil society used to be co-opted
or destroyed by the state, from trade unions to farmer cooperatives. Until
these groups develop a certain degree of autonomy, they lack the power to call
the regime to account for its policies (van de Walle 1990).
The experience in Cameroon, and elsewhere in Africa, suggests that there
is no automatic linkage between political and economie liberalization. In
African countries where autocratie and patrimonial regimes are still strug-
gling for their political survival during the democratization process, eco-
nomie reforms tend to be slowly and partially implemented and political
reforms tend to create political instability which scares away national and
international investors. Indeed, at least in the short term, there may be
conflicts between the two objectives. There is thus an increasing tendency
to emphasize the longer-term relationship between political and economie
liberalization, as well as to view democracy as an end in itself, rather than a
means to development.
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